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Abstract 
Zimbabweans have been both victims of and witnesses to 
serious human rights violations over the years. Though there is 
wide agreement and speculation that the state and its agencies 
are the perpetrators of these atrocities, they have largely 
remained unprosecuted and unpunished. Such impunity is inter 
alia the result of ineffective law enforcement mechanisms and 
institutions as well as the lack of capacity and legal knowledge of 
victims to approach the courts and seek redress. These factors 
negatively affected the protection of human rights and access to 
justice in Zimbabwe. 
Although the Lancaster House Constitution contained a 
Declaration of Rights, its enforcement mechanisms, particularly 
those relating to locus standi (legal standing), posed a great 
challenge to human rights litigation in Zimbabwe. This is so 
because the Lancaster House Constitution adopted the 
traditional common law approach to standing. Under this 
approach it was required that an individual must have a 
"personal, direct or substantial interest" in a matter in order to 
have standing. The Lancaster House Constitution failed to 
recognise the importance of broader rules of standing, which 
would accommodate public interest litigation, specifically for 
protecting human rights. Contrary to this, the new Constitution of 
Zimbabwe (2013) broadens the rules of standing in order to 
enhance access to the courts. This paper analyses the new 
approach to standing under the new constitutional dispensation 
in Zimbabwe. 
To this end, the discussion commences with an elucidation of the 
concept of locus standi and its link to access to justice. This is 
followed by an analysis of locus standi under the Lancaster 
House Constitution. Since the new approach in Zimbabwe is 
greatly informed by the South African approach to locus standi, 
a brief analysis of standing in South Africa is made. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of the approach to locus standi 
under the new constitution with a view to demonstrating how the 
new approach is likely to impact on the right of access to justice 
and human rights protection. 
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1  Introduction 
Zimbabweans have been both the victims of and the witnesses to serious 
human rights violations over the years.1 Though there is wide agreement 
and speculation that the state and its agencies are the perpetrators of these 
atrocities, they have largely remained unprosecuted and unpunished.2 Such 
impunity is inter alia the result of the ineffectiveness of the law enforcement 
mechanisms3 and institutions as well as the lack of capacity and legal 
knowledge of victims, who are therefore unable to approach the courts and 
seek redress. These factors have negatively affected the protection of 
human rights and access to justice in Zimbabwe.  
Although the Lancaster House Constitution contained a Declaration of 
Rights, its enforcement mechanisms, particularly those relating to locus 
standi (legal standing), posed a great challenge to human rights litigation in 
Zimbabwe. This is so because the Lancaster House Constitution adopted 
the traditional common law approach to standing.4 Under this approach it 
was required that an individual must have a "personal, direct or substantial 
interest"5 in a matter in order to have standing. The Lancaster House 
Constitution failed to recognise the importance of broader rules of standing, 
which would accommodate public interest litigation, specifically for 
protecting human rights. In contrast, the new Constitution of Zimbabwe 
(2013) broadens the rules of standing in order to enhance access to the 
courts. This paper analyses the new approach to standing under the new 
constitutional dispensation in Zimbabwe. 
To this end, the discussion commences with an elucidation of the concept 
of locus standi and its link to access to justice. This is followed by an 
analysis of locus standi under the Lancaster House Constitution.6 Since the 
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1  Human Rights Watch 2011 http://bit.ly/1qwVpX2 3. 
2  Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2012 http://bit.ly/1TmA4Yx 9-11. 
3  Human Rights Watch 2011 http://bit.ly/1qwVpX2 3. 
4  The words locus standi and standing are used interchangeably in this paper. 
5  See s 24(1) of the Lancaster House Constitution, 1979. 
6  An analysis of the locus standi provision under the Lancaster House Constitution is 
necessary in order to ascertain how its locus standi provisions affected access to 
justice and human rights litigation in Zimbabwe. It is also important in that the paper 
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new approach in Zimbabwe is greatly informed by the South African 
approach to locus standi, a brief analysis of standing in South Africa is 
provided.7 The paper concludes with a discussion of the approach to locus 
standi under the new constitution with a view to demonstrating how the new 
approach is likely to impact on the right to access to justice and human rights 
protection. 
2 Locus standi 
Locus standi relates to whether a particular applicant is entitled to seek 
redress from the courts in respect of a particular issue.8 Standing 
determines whether an individual or group of individuals or an entity has the 
right to claim redress on a justiciable matter before a tribunal authorised to 
grant the redress sought. Abebe notes that standing is a preliminary issue 
that does not include the consideration of or any form of determination over 
the merits of the case.9 Locus standi may be regarded as an essential tool 
for the realisation of human rights. 
The concept of standing is intertwined with the right of access to justice. 
Furthermore, effective access to justice is considered as the most basic 
requirement of a legal system, which purports to guarantee legal rights.10 
Access to justice is a right recognised under major international and regional 
human rights instruments.11 It guarantees that every person has access to 
an independent and impartial court or tribunal and the opportunity to receive 
a fair and just trial when that individual's liberty or property is at stake. 
However, it has been noted that access to justice does not always involve 
judicial recourse but also the availability of accessible, affordable and 
effective means for redress.12  
                                            
seeks to bring out how the departure from the Lancaster House Constitution position 
seeks to improve access to justice and human rights litigation in Zimbabwe. 
7  The comparative analysis with the locus standi provision in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 is made because of the influence the South African 
provision had in the drafting of the locus standi provision in the new Zimbabwean 
Constitution. It is therefore crucial that an analysis of the South Africa position is made 
to effectively bring out how the standing position in South Africa has positively 
influenced human rights litigation in South Africa and how the inclusion of the same 
provision can bode well for human rights litigation in Zimbabwe. 
8  Loots 1989 SALJ 131. 
9  Abebe 2010 AHRLJ 408. 
10  Cappelletti Judicial Process 36. 
11  See for example arts 7 and 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); art 
14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); also see art 7 of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (1981). 
12  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment 9: The 
Domestic Application of the Covenant UN Doc E/C 12/1998/24 (1998) para 2. 
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Access to justice is crucial to the realisation of human rights. To enhance 
such access, it is important that rules of standing are not overly strict or 
narrow to the extent that potential litigants are unduly denied access to 
relevant judicial bodies. This view is supported by Kay who is of the opinion 
that liberal standing rules enhance an active enforcement of human rights, 
whilst excessively strict rules stultify the opportunity of review for 
constitutionality.13 In some African jurisdictions, including Zimbabwe, it has 
been observed that strict rules of standing can be a major barrier to the 
protection of human rights.14 
2.1  Locus standi under the Lancaster House Constitution 
The locus standi rules under the Lancaster House Constitution adopted the 
common law approach, which provided for the traditional narrow rules of 
standing. The question of locus standi (the traditional narrow rules of 
standing) under the Lancaster House Constitution provided a challenge to 
human rights litigation in Zimbabwe. Linington notes that the problem with 
regards to locus standi under the Lancaster House Constitution was further 
compounded by the language used under section 24 of the Lancaster 
House Constitution (as it set out a number of options for enforcing 
constitutional rights) and by the judiciary's understanding (or lack of 
understanding) of the provision.15 
The Lancaster House Constitution provided for two ways in which a case 
involving the violation of rights could be brought before the courts. A person 
could approach the Supreme Court directly for redress if he or she alleged 
that the Declaration of Rights had been, was being or was likely to be 
contravened in relation to him or her. Section 24(1) of the Lancaster House 
Constitution stated that: 
If any person alleges that the Declaration of Rights has been, is being or is 
likely to be contravened in relation to him (or, in the case of a person who is 
detained, if any other person alleges such a contravention in relation to the 
detained person), then, without prejudice to any other action with respect to 
the same matter which is lawfully available, that person (or that other person) 
may, subject to the provisions of subsection (3), apply to the Supreme Court 
for redress. 
Thus, section 24(1) sought to provide direct access to the Supreme Court 
to any person who alleged personal violation of their rights. The purpose of 
                                            
13  Kay "Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues" 1. 
14  See the example of Nigeria in Obiagwu and Odinkalu "Combating Legacies of 
Colonialism and Militarism" 233. 
15  Linington "Developing a New Bill of Rights" 49. 
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section 24(1) in human rights litigation was to provide speedy access to the 
Supreme Court, which was the final court under the Lancaster House 
Constitution.16  
In terms of section 24(1) of the Lancaster House Constitution it was, 
therefore, not enough that one had an interest in a matter when seeking to 
approach the Supreme Court directly, as the applicant's own rights must 
have been affected.17 This approach was reiterated in the case of United 
Parties v Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs.18 In this case, 
the applicant, a political party, wanted to challenge the constitutionality of 
provisions of the Electoral Act.19 The provisions gave constituency 
registrars the right to object to the registration of voters, as well as the right 
to desist from having to take any action in respect of objections lodged by 
voters regarding the retention of their names on the voters' roll. The 
Supreme Court held that the political party had no locus standi in judicio to 
challenge the provisions of the Electoral Act, which it alleged contravened 
the right to the freedom of expression of voters, such as the right protected 
under section 20 of the Lancaster House Constitution.20 Gubbay CJ stated 
that: 
[T]hus section 24(1) affords the applicant locus standi in judicio to seek 
redress for a contravention of the Declaration of Rights only in relation to itself 
(the exception being where a person is detained). It has no right either on 
behalf of the general public or anyone else. The applicant must be able to 
show a likelihood of itself being affected by the law impugned before it can 
invoke a constitutional right to invalidate the law.21 
Although the Lancaster House Constitution provided for an automatic right 
of direct access to the Supreme Court, an applicant had to satisfy the 
                                            
16  See Mhandirwhe v Minister of State 1986 1 ZLR 1 (S) where Baron JA stated, "Section 
24(1) provides access to the final court in the land. The issue will always be whether 
there has been an infringement of an individual's rights or freedoms, and frequently 
will involve the liberty of the individual: constitutional issues of this kind usually find 
their way to this court, bit a favourable judgment obtained at the conclusion of the 
normal and sometimes very lengthy, judicial process could well be of little value. And 
even where speed is not of essence there are obvious advantages to the litigants and 
to the public to have an important constitutional issue decided directly by the Supreme 
Court without protracted litigation". 
17  Linington "Developing a New Bill of Rights" 52. 
18  United Parties v The Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs 1998 2 BCLR 
224 (ZS). 
19  Electoral Act [Chapter 2:01]. 
20  Section 20 of the Lancaster House Constitution, which protected the right of freedom 
of expression.  
21  United Parties v The Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs 1997 2 ZLR 
254 (S) 258B-E. Also see Retrofit (Pvt) Ltd v Posts and Telecommunications 
Corporation 1995 2 ZLR 199 (S) 207H-208A. 
L CHIDUZA & PN MAKIWANE  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  6 
requisite locus standi test22. It was therefore not enough that one had an 
interest in a matter when approaching the Supreme Court directly. In 
addition, the applicant's own rights must have been affected in order for the 
applicant to be able to approach the Court directly.  
The second way of bringing cases involving the Declaration of Rights was 
provided under section 24(2) of the Lancaster House Constitution. This 
section stated that: 
If in any proceedings in the High Court or in any court subordinate to the High 
Court any question arises as to the contravention of the Declaration of Rights, 
the person presiding in that court, may, and if so requested by any party to the 
proceedings shall, refer the question to the Supreme Court unless, in his 
opinion, the raising of the question is merely frivolous or vexatious. 
In accordance with the Constitution, any court, and if so requested by any 
party to the proceedings, had the power to refer matters involving any 
alleged breach of the Declaration of Rights to the Supreme Court. The 
exception to the aforementioned rule was if the court viewed the raising of 
the question as merely frivolous or vexatious. Any failure by a lower court 
to refer such a matter to the Supreme Court was viewed as a breach of the 
Declaration of Rights, unless the court viewed the raising of the question as 
frivolous or vexatious.23 The Supreme Court held that a referral under 
section 24(2) should not take place unless an answer was material to the 
decision that the lower court had to make.24 It was therefore important that 
the question had to be raised in the lower court so that the referral could be 
done.25 A referral could not be done after the lower court had reached its 
decision; and the avenue for dealing with such a constitutional issue was 
through the appeal process.26 
The narrow rules on standing under the Lancaster House Constitution 
posed a serious problem in terms of access to justice. The rules failed to 
                                            
22  The locus standi test under s 24(1) of the Lancaster House Constitution as described 
on the previous page.  
23  Martin v Attorney- General 1993 1 ZLR 153 (SC) 158. In delivering his judgment in 
this case, Gubbay CJ stated that "[s]uppose that a judicial officer, solely due to the 
animosity towards an accused, in bad faith and without any warrant, were to rule that 
the question raised by him was frivolous or vexatious and so order his remand in 
custody pending trial. Could it be then said that the accused was only entitled to 
approach the Supreme Court for relief under section 24(3)? I think not. Such action by 
the judicial officer concerned would, as mentioned before, itself constitute an 
infringement of the accused's entitlement to the protection of the law. Moreover, and 
most importantly, since at the conclusion of any remand proceedings there is no right 
of appeal, no remedy under section 24(3) would be available to that accused". 
24  S v Mbire 1997 1 ZLR 579 (SC); Jesse v Attorney-General 1999 1 ZLR 121 (SC). 
25  S v Mbire 1997 1 ZLR 579 (SC); Jesse v Attorney-General 1999 1 ZLR 121 (SC). 
26  Muchero v Attorney-General 2000 2 ZLR 286 (SC). 
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recognise the practical barriers that prevented marginalised and vulnerable 
groups from accessing the courts. Groups from indigent communities were 
at a disadvantage in this regard, as they lacked the financial means and the 
knowledge to access courts. Thus, the narrow approach appears to have 
been an obstacle in human rights litigation in Zimbabwe. The discussion 
below seeks to emphasise this point. 
3  The judiciary and locus standi under the Lancaster 
House Constitution 
In a country where human rights abuses have been prevalent for many 
years, the narrow approach adopted in the Lancaster House Constitution 
concerning locus standi was a further major obstacle in addressing human 
rights violations. This was particularly true for the indigent groups. 
Mapfumo notes that due to the narrow rules on standing under the 
Lancaster House Constitution, the judiciary under Gubbay CJ developed a 
conservative position and developed some flexibility in human rights 
litigation to enhance human rights protection in Zimbabwe.27 For example, 
the Supreme Court under Gubbay CJ arguably adopted some flexibility in 
human rights litigation by extending standing to a human rights orgnisation28 
and the law society.29 In the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in 
Zimbabwe v Attorney-General30 case, the Supreme Court allowed a human 
rights organisation to challenge the constitutionality of the death sentence. 
The Court noted that the organisation's "avowed objects" were "to uphold 
human rights, including the most fundamental right of all, the right to life", 
and that it was "intimately concerned with the protection and preservation 
of the rights and freedoms granted to persons in Zimbabwe by the 
Constitution".31 These factors persuaded the Court that the organisation 
was an appropriate body to assert the claim in question and concluded that: 
…it would be wrong to fetter itself by pedantically circumscribing the class of 
persons who may approach it for relief to the condemned prisoners 
themselves; especially as they were not only indigent but, by reason of their 
                                            
27  Mapfumo Whither to, the Judiciary in Zimbabwe? 22. 
28  See the case of Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v Attorney-
General 1993 4 SA 239 (ZS). 
29  See the case of Law Society of Zimbabwe v Minister of Finance (Attorney-General 
Intervening) 1999 2 ZLR 231 (SC). 
30  Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v Attorney-General 1993 4 
SA 239 (ZS). 
31  Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v Attorney-General 1993 4 
SA 239 (ZS) 246H. 
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confinement, would have experienced practical difficulty in timeously obtaining 
interim relief from the Court.32 
However, there were instances where the Supreme Court under Gubbay CJ 
adopted the view that it was not enough for an applicant to have an interest 
in a matter when seeking to approach the Supreme Court directly in terms 
of section 24(1) of the Lancaster House Constitution. An applicant had also 
to show that his or her rights had been affected. This approach was followed 
in the case of United Parties v Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary 
Affairs,33 where the applicant was denied locus standi. In denying the 
applicant standing, the Supreme Court held that the impugned provisions 
affected the rights of voters and since political parties were not voters, locus 
standi could not thus be granted to political parties. In criticism of the 
judgment of the Supreme Court, Madhuku argued that the applicant had to 
be granted locus standi as electoral issues that affected the public also 
affected political parties.34 Thus, the approach by the courts provided a 
missed opportunity for the judges to enhance public interest litigation in 
Zimbabwe. 
Subsequent to Gubbay CJ's leadership of the judiciary, there has been no 
noticeable or significant effort to develop the rules on standing. The judiciary 
has adopted a strict interpretation of the traditional rules applying to 
standing, which has frequently resulted in the dismissal of human rights 
cases on mere technicalities. Thus, the Supreme Court (the majority) has, 
for example denied locus standi to challenge laws relating to the presidential 
elections to the leading opposition candidate in that election.35 However, in 
a dissenting judgment Sandura JA noted that: 
Quite clearly, the entitlement of every person to the protection of the law, 
which is proclaimed in section 18(1) of the Lancaster House Constitution, 
embraces the right to require the legislature, which in terms of section 32(1) 
of the Constitution consists of the President and parliament, to pass laws, 
which are consistent with the Constitution. If, therefore, the legislature passes 
a law, which is inconsistent with the Declaration of Rights, any person who is 
adversely affected by such a law has the locus standi to challenge the 
constitutionality of that law by bringing an application directly to this court in 
                                            
32  Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v Attorney-General 1993 4 
SA 239 (ZS) 246H-247A. 
33  United Parties v The Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs 1997 2 ZLR 
254 (S). 
34  Madhuku 1998 Legal Forum 48. 
35  See the case of Tsvangirai v Registrar General of Elections (76/02) 2002 ZWSC 20 (4 
April 2002). In this case the litigant contended that the Electoral Act (Modification) 
Notice, Statutory Instrument 41D of 2002 published three days before the 2002 
Presidential election by the President (the laws restricted postal voting to only 
members of the uniformed forces) violated his rights to protection of law and freedom 
of expression as envisaged under the Lancaster House Constitution.  
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terms of section 24(1) of the Constitution. Thus, in the present case, the 
applicant had the right to demand that the presidential election be conducted 
in terms of the Electoral Law passed by parliament as required by section 
28(4) of the Constitution. In the circumstances, he had the right to approach 
this Court directly in terms of section 24(1) of the Constitution and had the 
locus standi to file the application.36 
In supporting the position of Sandura JA, De Bourbon notes that the 
approach of the majority to deny a candidate in the election the right to 
challenge laws, which directly affected the manner in which the election was 
conducted, could not be justified.37 He notes that the approach by the 
majority was too narrow.38 
A number of cases, post Gubbay CJ's leadership of the judiciary denote that 
the issue of standing had been used to limit access to courts in cases where 
human rights violations had been alleged. In the case of Capitol Radio (Pvt) 
Ltd v Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe,39 the Court denied the litigant 
access to the court on the basis that it was not licensed in terms of the 
Broadcasting Services Act,40 an Act that the litigant was challenging. The 
Court failed to realise that the litigant was asking it to protect its rights, which 
it averred were being infringed upon by the impugned Act. The Court wanted 
the litigant to submit to this legislation before challenging its constitutionality.  
The narrow interpretation of the rules of standing adopted by the judiciary 
became an impediment to human rights litigation in Zimbabwe. It limited 
litigants' right to access courts for the protection of their fundamental rights 
and freedoms. In an effort to improve human rights litigation and access to 
justice, the new constitutional dispensation in Zimbabwe, with great 
influence from the South African legal system, has adopted a more liberal 
approach to standing. As a result, the discussion below makes a brief 
analysis of the South African constitutional position on standing. The 
discussion will show how the liberal approach has enhanced the realisation 
of human rights.  
4 Standing in South Africa 
The post-apartheid legal framework in South Africa provides an 
environment conducive to public interest litigation. The South African 
Constitution has adopted a liberal approach to locus standi as it provides 
                                            
36  Tsvangirai v Registrar General of Elections (76/02) 2002 ZWSC 20 (4 April 2002). 
37  De Bourbon 2003 AHRLJ 201. 
38  De Bourbon 2003 AHRLJ 201. 
39  Capital Radio (Pvt) Ltd v Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (162/2001) (Pvt) 2003 
ZWSC 65 (25 September 2003). 
40  Broadcasting Services Act [Chapter 12:06]. 
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various forms of public interest standing for the protection of rights in the Bill 
of Rights.41 Liebenberg notes that section 38 of the Constitution makes 
broad and generous provision for persons who allege that a right in the Bill 
of Rights has been infringed or threatened to approach a court for 
appropriate relief.42 Liebenberg further argues that the Constitutional Court 
has adopted an objective approach to standing in Bill of Rights litigation. It 
is not required that an applicant be personally adversely affected by an 
alleged human rights violation in order to have standing. It suffices if, 
objectively, a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and 
the applicant can demonstrate, with reference to section 38(a)-(e), that he 
or she has "a sufficient interest" in obtaining the remedy sought.43  
Crucially section 38(d) grants standing to "anyone acting in the public 
interest". Although there is no universally accepted definition of public 
interest, the South African Law Commission defined an action in the public 
interest as: 
…an action instituted by a representative in the interest of the public generally, 
or in the interest of a section of the public, but not necessarily in that 
representative's own interest. Judgment of the court in respect of a public 
interest action shall not be binding on the persons in whose interest the action 
is brought.44 
Cote and Van Garderen note that it was evident from the report of the Law 
Reform Commission that there was confusion at the time regarding what 
the scope of public interest litigation would be in South Africa.45 In order to 
enhance public interest litigation, the criteria for determining whether one 
acted "genuinely in the public interest" were laid down in the case of Ferreira 
v Levin.46 In this case, O'Regan J stated that: 
Factors relevant to determining whether a person is genuinely acting in the 
public interest will include considerations such as: whether there is another 
                                            
41  See s 38 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 that states, "Anyone 
listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a right 
in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant 
appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. The persons who may approach a 
court are-  
(a)  anyone acting in their own interest; 
(b)  anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name; 
(c)  anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of person; 
(d)  anyone acting in the public interest; and  
(e)  an association acting in the interests of its members." 
42  Liebenberg "Reflections on the Drafting a Bill of Rights" 40. 
43  This approach was established by the Court in Ferreira v Levin 1996 1 SA 984 (CC). 
44  SALC 1998 http://bit.ly/1W4IqtG. 
45  Cote and Van Garderen 2011 SAJHR 178. 
46  Ferreira v Levin 1996 1 SA 984 (CC). 
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reasonable and effective manner in which the challenge can be brought.; the 
nature of the relief sought, and the extent to which it is of general and 
prospective application; and the range of persons or groups who may be 
directly or indirectly affected by any order made by the Court and the 
opportunity that those persons or groups have had to present evidence and 
argument to the Court.47 
In Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of Home Affairs,48 the Constitutional 
Court stated what would be required for a person or organisation to be 
judged to be acting in the public interest when they were not directly affected 
by the case. In addition to the criteria laid down in Ferreira v Levin,49 the 
Court added the degree of the vulnerability of the people affected; the nature 
of the right said to be infringed; and the consequences of the infringement 
of the right as crucial elements to be considered.50 Abebe believes that this 
criterion is aimed at ensuring the genuineness of the applicants' motives by 
stifling cases brought for personal or publicity or political reasons under the 
guise of the public interest.51  
The Constitution of South Africa enhances access to justice and stipulates 
that everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the 
application of the law decided in a fair public hearing in a court or, where 
appropriate, another independent and impartial forum.52 The aim of the 
sections discussed above is to make courts accessible to the ordinary 
citizen either by self-representation or through public interest groups and 
individuals.53 
Despite challenges such as a lack of funding and a lack of experienced and 
skilled staff, the liberal rules on standing in South Africa have successfully 
enabled human rights litigation by members of civil society, particularly 
human rights non-governmental Organisations (NGOs).54 Human rights 
groups have used these liberal rules to initiate court cases and have at times 
intervened on behalf of disadvantaged groups and individuals in human 
                                            
47  Ferreira v Levin 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para 234. 
48  2004 4 SA 125 (CC).  
49  1996 1 SA 984 (CC). 
50  Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of Home Affairs 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) paras 16-
18. 
51  Abebe 2010 AHRLJ 414. 
52  See s 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
53  It should be noted that the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 was enacted in an effort to 
restructure the judiciary and the courts and thus to improve access to justice in South 
Africa. The enactment of the Act seeks to ensure equal access to justice through the 
provision of easy access to the courts in all provinces. 
54  Abebe 2010 AHRLJ 413. 
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rights litigation.55 Several interest groups such as the Society for the 
Abolition of the Death Penalty,56 The Women's Legal Centre,57 Christian 
Education South Africa,58 the AIDS Law Project59 and the Community Law 
Centre60 have over the years successfully initiated or intervened in litigation 
in protecting the rights of selected groups. A number of these cases have 
made an impact on the lives of disadvantaged South Africans.61 
5  Locus standi under the new Zimbabwean Constitution 
5.1  Declaration of Rights 
The Declaration of Rights in Chapter 4 of the new Constitution of Zimbabwe 
contains a broader protection62 of human rights, which include first 
generation,63 second generation64 and third generation65 human rights. 
Section 44 of the Constitution places a duty on the State and every person, 
including juristic persons, to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights 
and freedoms in the Declaration of Rights. Section 45(1) goes further to 
                                            
55  See the Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC), where 
the Constitutional Court found in favour of the Treatment Action Campaign that the 
government had a legal duty to provide anti-retroviral drugs to HIV-positive pregnant 
women. 
56  Intervention in S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) and in Mohamed v President 
of the Republic of South Africa 2001 7 BCLR 685 (CC). 
57  Intervention in Moseneke v The Master 2001 2 SA 18 (CC). 
58  Applicants in Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 1998 12 BCLR 
1449 (CC) and Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 10 
BCLR 1051 (CC). 
59  Intervention in Hoffman v South African Airways 2000 11 BCLR 1211 (CC). 
60  Intervention in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 11 
BCLR 1169 (CC). 
61  It should also be noted that public interest litigation strategies and interventions in 
courts by organised civil society have resulted in tremendous victories for 
disadvantaged groups in other parts of the world such as Canada and India. In 
Canada, amongst many other issues, courts have recognised the rights of farm 
workers to bargain collectively, due to public interest litigation brought on their behalf: 
(Frasier v Ontario (Attorney General) 2008 OJ No 1219 (CA)). In India, public interest 
litigation has been used to protect the rights and interests of marginalised populations, 
which include, amongst many others, children and migrant labourers. For more, see 
the following cases: Laxmi Kant Pandey v Union of India 1984 SC 469; Sheela Barse 
v Secretary, Children's Aid Society 1987 SC 659. 
62  Broader than the protection provided by the Lancaster House Constitution, which 
catered for only first-generation rights. 
63  These include, amongst many other rights, the right to personal liberty (s 49 of the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe); s 51 the right to human dignity; s 53 the freedom from 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; s 52 the right to 
personal security; and s 67 political rights. 
64  These include amongst many other rights, s 71 the right to health care; s 75 the right 
to education; and s 77 the right to food and water.  
65  See s 73 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
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state that the Declaration of Rights binds the executive, legislature,66 judicial 
institutions67 and agencies of government at every level.68 The direct vertical 
application of the Declaration of Rights, therefore, gives an individual the 
power to challenge the conduct of any of the organs of state for any breach 
of their duties under the Declaration of Rights. On the other hand, section 
45(2), like section 8(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,69 
recognises that private bodies may also perpetrate the abuse of human 
rights and seeks to protect individuals against the abuse of their rights by 
other individuals. 
5.2  Standing under the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
Under the new Constitution, standing (in the Declaration of Rights) has been 
expanded substantially with a view to improving the protection of human 
rights. As was noted earlier, the revised position on standing in the new 
Constitution is modelled on the analogous South African provision, and thus 
includes a wide range of forms of public interest standing.  
In the enforcement of fundamental human rights and freedoms, section 
85(1) of the Constitution states that: 
[a]ny of the following persons, namely (a) any person acting in their own 
interests; (b) any person acting on behalf of another person who cannot act 
for themselves; (c) any person acting as a member, or in the interests, of a 
group or class of persons; (d) any person acting in the public interest; (e) any 
association acting in the interests of its members; is entitled to approach a 
court, alleging that a fundamental right or freedom enshrined in this Chapter 
                                            
66  See the South African example of De Lille v Speaker of the National Assembly 1998 
3 SA 430 (CC).  
67  In the course of adjudicating legal disputes, judges and magistrates are therefore 
required to conduct themselves in a way that complies with the Declaration of Rights 
provisions. Thus, courts must promote the values and principles that underlie a society 
and that are recognised under the Constitution, which are based on the supremacy of 
the constitution, the rule of law, openness, justice, human dignity, equality and 
freedom. (See s 3 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe). 
68  Section 45 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, which states that "(1) This Chapter binds 
the State and all executive and judicial institutions and agencies of government at 
every level. (2) This Chapter binds natural and juristic persons to the extent that it is 
applicable to them, taking into account the nature of the right or freedom concerned 
and any duty imposed by it. (3) Juristic persons as well as natural persons are entitled 
to the rights and freedoms set out in this Chapter to the extent that those rights and 
freedoms can appropriately be extended to them." On the other hand, also see s 8(1) 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 that states, "The Bill of Rights 
applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs 
of state". 
69  Section 8(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 states: "A 
provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural and juristic person if and to the extent 
that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature and duty 
imposed by the right".  
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has been, is being or likely to be infringed, and the court may grant appropriate 
relief, including a declaration of rights and an award of compensation. 
The above section provides for the enforcement of rights where the right 
has been violated, where the violation is under way, and where the violation 
is imminent or likely. This means that people do not have to wait for their 
rights to be violated first before seeking redress before the courts. 
Individuals can now approach the court for the enforcement of their rights 
even in cases where their rights are only threatened. In terms of the 
Constitution, where a court finds that an applicant's rights have been 
violated or threatened, the court can make an order for compensation or a 
declaration of rights. The court has the discretion to determine the 
appropriate relief as dictated by the particular circumstances. 
Section 85 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe also identifies a number of 
litigants that may have standing when alleging that a right in the Declaration 
of Rights has been infringed or threatened.70 Section 85 has considerably 
expanded the traditional rules of locus standi. Section 85 allows class 
actions/public interest actions and thus enhances human rights litigation. As 
has been noted in other jurisdictions,71 litigation brought by an individual or 
organisation on behalf of third parties who are unable to access the courts 
has proven successful at protecting the rights of marginalised groups. The 
broadening of such rules therefore seeks to address past problems relating 
to access to courts by ensuring that no individuals are denied standing to 
litigate on constitutional issues. The broader rules of standing seek to 
advance the goals and values of a participatory democracy by permitting 
the participation and involvement of socially and economically 
disadvantaged individuals who may be unable to assert their rights through 
the political process. Thus, the various forms of public interest standing will 
serve as a tool to achieve social change through the law and as a vehicle 
for social reform for those with commitments to social justice and the rule of 
law.72  
It is also important that, since the new Constitution now provides for various 
types of public interest litigation, criteria must be put in place by the courts 
and used to determine whether or not one proposes to act "genuinely in the 
                                            
70 Section 85 of the new Constitution of Zimbabwe still includes the traditional approach 
to standing (those acting in their own interest); anyone acting on behalf of another 
person who cannot act for themselves (representative standing); anyone acting as a 
member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons (class actions); anyone 
acting in the public interest (public interest standing); and an association acting in the 
interest of its members (organisational standing). 
71  An example is that of South Africa, as discussed earlier in this paper.  
72  Hershkoff and McCutcheron "Public Interest Litigation" 96. 
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public interest". Such criteria can be informed by South African 
jurisprudence, as discussed previously in this paper. The criteria will thus 
ensure the genuineness of the applicants' motives by stifling cases brought 
for personal or publicity or political reasons under the guise of the public 
interest. 
The value of the broader rules of standing in Zimbabwe will be enhanced if 
the courts are generally accessible and if all litigants are guaranteed fair 
hearings. This will be in line with the obligations created under the 
Constitution.73 The independence and impartiality of the judiciary in 
Zimbabwe will play an important role in ensuring that the rights of litigants 
are protected.  
5.3  Rules of Court with reference to section 85(1) of the Constitution 
of Zimbabwe 
Section 85(3) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe mandates that the rules of 
every court must provide for the procedure to be followed in cases where 
relief is sought under section 85(1). Section 85(3) states that: 
The rules of every court must provide for the procedure to be followed in cases 
where relief is sought under subsection (1), and those rules must ensure that- 
(a) the right to approach the court under subsection (1) is fully facilitated; (b) 
formalities relating to the proceedings, including their commencement are kept 
to a minimum; (c) the court, while observing the rules of natural justice, is not 
unreasonably restricted by procedural technicalities; and (d) a person with 
particular expertise may, with the leave of the court, appear as a friend of the 
court. 
The Constitution demands that rules must be put in place to facilitate 
constitutional litigation under section 85(1) (a)-(e) and to ensure that in the 
handling of cases, courts are not restricted by "procedural technicalities". 
The above section also seeks to improve access to justice and to remove 
any delays in the hearing of cases. This will ensure the protection of rights 
and ensure that such cases are speedily resolved, with formalities kept to a 
minimum. In order to guarantee access to the courts for constitutional 
litigation, the Constitution stipulates that the absence of the rules in section 
                                            
73  Section 69 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe states, "… (2) In the determination of civil 
rights and obligations, every person has a right to a fair, speedy and public hearing 
within a reasonable time before an independent and impartial court, tribunal, or other 
forum established by law. (3) Every person has the right of access to the courts or to 
some other tribunal or forum established by law for the resolution of any dispute…” 
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85(3) will not limit the right to commence proceedings under section 85(1) 
and to have the case heard and determined by a court.74  
5.4  Amicus curiae procedure and rules 
Section 85(3)(d) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe allows for an amicus 
curiae, a person with a strong interest in or views on the subject matter of 
an action, but not a party to the action, to petition the courts and advise the 
court on some matter of the law that directly affects the case in question. It 
is important that rules providing guidelines as to who can act as amicus 
curiae in all courts as anticipated by section 85(3) be drafted along the same 
lines as those of the Zimbabwean Constitutional Court (which are discussed 
in the following paragraphs).75 
It is also important that since the Constitution allows an amicus curiae to 
petition the courts, that Constitutional Court rules should be drafted to 
recognise the role of such an amicus curiae. Perhaps the example set by 
South Africa can be used as a guiding tool in drafting legislation that will 
encompass the amicus curiae rules. It should be noted that the participation 
of amicus curiae is a well-established practice in South African legal history. 
Brickhill and Du Plessis note that South African courts are increasingly 
recognising that certain matters must necessarily involve the perspectives 
and voices of organisations or entities that may not have a direct legal 
interest in the matters.76 In South Africa, legislative provision for amicus 
curiae is made under the Constitutional Court Rule 10 of the Constitutional 
Court Rules. It provides guidelines as to who can act as an amicus curiae 
in a Constitutional Court hearing. Rule 10 provides that any person 
interested in any matter before the Court may, with the written consent of 
all the parties, be admitted as amicus curiae.77 If the parties to the case do 
not give such consent, an application may be made to the Chief Justice.78 
The amicus curiae rules also provide for the form and content of an amicus 
curiae application.79 The rules state that the application should briefly 
describe the interest of, and the position to be adopted by, the amicus 
                                            
74  Section 85(4) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
75  For example, in South Africa Rule 16A of the Uniform Rules of Court is drafted along 
the same lines as Rule 10 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court. 
76  Brickhill and Du Plessis 2011 SAJHR 152. 
77  Rule 10(1) of the Rules of the Constitutional Court. 
78  Rule 10(4) of the Rules of the Constitutional Court. 
79  Rule 10(6) of the Rules of the Constitutional Court. 
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curiae. The application should also set out the submissions and state their 
relevance to the proceedings.80 
Mbazira notes that in South Africa the impact of the amicus curiae in human 
rights litigation has largely been seen in the general context of public interest 
litigation81 and has been felt in economic, social and cultural rights 
litigation.82 Thus, the drafting of the rules recognising the role of amicus 
curiae in Zimbabwe will ensure the vigorous use of the amicus curiae 
provision. They may help to give meaning to a number of rights under the 
Declaration of Rights; ensure the development of the procedures regarding 
intervention; and lead to the establishment of the amicus curiae procedure 
as part of the legal and judicial practice. Public interest litigation in 
Zimbabwe will be enhanced thereby. Non-governmental organisations and 
other human rights organisations will be allowed to use the liberalised rules 
of standing to initiate court cases or seek to be admitted as amicus curiae 
on behalf of individuals or groups in litigation of various human rights issues. 
Furthermore, to enhance the role of the amicus curiae and public interest 
litigation in Zimbabwe, NGOs need to be provided with an enabling 
environment, as that is crucial for the promotion and protection of human 
rights.83 Over the years, the activities of NGOs in Zimbabwe have been 
severely curtailed by the government through the enactment of restrictive 
legislation such as the Private Voluntary Organisations Act (PVO Act).84 The 
Act was used to threaten NGOs involved in human rights work that they had 
to register with the then Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social 
Welfare or risk prosecution.85 Such measures have crippled the operations 
of a majority of NGOs in Zimbabwe and, as a result, forced a number of 
them to shut down.86 This has negatively affected the promotion and 
protection of human rights by NGOs in the country. The Zimbabwe Human 
                                            
80  Rule 10(6) of the Rules of the Constitutional Court. 
81  Mbazira 2012 LDD 204. 
82  For example, see amongst several other cases: Government of the Republic of South 
Africa v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC); Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 
4 SA 1 (CC); and Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 
(CC). 
83  For example, Mbazira 2012 LDD 208 notes that the role of the amicus curiae has been 
noted in the context of the prevalence of human rights NGOs in South Africa. These 
NGOs, such as the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), the Freedom of Expression 
Institute (FXI), and the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) and Lawyers 
for Human Rights have either used the liberalised standing requirement to initiate court 
cases. They have also sought admission as amicus curiae on behalf of individuals or 
groups in litigation of various human rights issues. 
84  Private Voluntary Organisations Act 22 of 2001 [Chapter 17:05] (the PVO Act). 
85  See s 6 of the PVO Act. 
86  Chamboko 2012 http://bit.ly/1NABzpc. 
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Rights Commission (ZHRC) has realised the importance of NGOs in human 
rights promotion and protection,87 and it follows that it is important that the 
PVO Act must be repealed to enhance the role of NGOs in fostering a 
culture of human rights in Zimbabwe. Lawyers taking up human rights cases 
in Zimbabwe have been subjected to arrest, abuse and torture for fighting 
for the protection of human rights. Human rights lawyers such as Andrew 
Makoni, Alec Muchadehama and Beatrice Mtetwa (a board member of the 
Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights) have been subjected to arrests and 
threats for taking up human rights cases.88 An enabling and free political 
environment is crucial in enhancing the ability of NGOs to litigate either 
through the amicus curiae procedure or through using the liberal rules on 
standing, and thus enhance the culture of public interest litigation in 
Zimbabwe. 
5.5  Removal of "dirty hands" doctrine 
Besides expanding the rules of standing, the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
explicitly removes the concept of "dirty hands"89 as a bar to constitutional 
litigation. The Constitution explicitly states "…the fact that a person has 
contravened a law does not debar them from approaching a court for relief 
under subsection (1)".90 This provision seeks to ensure that persons who 
may be guilty of contempt are not precluded from instituting constitutional 
applications. The provision also seeks to guide the judiciary in dealing with 
such cases. Under the leadership of Chidyausiku CJ, the judiciary has used 
this "dirty hands" doctrine to deny persons standing before the courts, thus 
hindering the protection of human rights.  
In contradiction of the decision of Minister of Home Affairs v Bickle,91 the 
Supreme Court ruled in the Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe (Pty) v 
                                            
87  ZHRC 2014 http://bit.ly/1XCSfi1. 
88  See FIDH 2012 http://bit.ly/1VbzqSp 20. 
89  The "dirty hands" doctrine manifests the principle that one cannot seek equitable relief 
or assert an equitable defence if that party has violated an equitable principle such as 
good faith. 
90  Section 85(2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
91  Minister of Home Affairs v Bickle 1983 1 ZLR 99 (S). In this case the Supreme Court 
held that the effect of s 24 (Lancaster House Constitution), as read with s 18(1) and 
(9) of the Lancaster House Constitution, was that the courts cannot, except in the most 
exceptional circumstances, deny aggrieved persons access to them. Fieldsend CJ 
stated that the constitutional right of access should prevail unless it is plain that the 
contempt either of any process or of the law of which the applicant may be guilty itself 
impedes the course of justice. In making its decision, the court relied on the English 
decision of Hadkinson v Hadkinson 1952 All ER 567 (CA) 574 where Denning LJ 
stated, "it is a strong thing for a court to refuse to hear a party to a cause and it is only 
to be justified by grave considerations of public policy. It is a step which a court will 
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Minister of State for Information and Publicity in the President's Office92 that 
a corporate entity could not challenge the constitutionality of the provisions 
in the Access to Information and Privacy Act93 because it had "dirty hands". 
The applicant (the owner of The Daily News) had failed to register in terms 
of the Act and because of this failure; Chidyausiku CJ ruled that the 
applicant had failed to comply with the impugned legislation. Because of the 
non-compliance, the applicant had "dirty hands", which precluded it from 
proceeding with the constitutional application. 
Feltoe notes that although the applicant raised the Bickle case in its heads 
of argument, the Supreme Court never referred to this case in its 
judgment.94 Linington notes that instead of relying on the Bickle case, the 
Supreme Court relied on the English case of F Hoffman-La Roche and Co 
AG v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry,95 that had not been raised 
by either side in the proceedings and was not relevant in the discussion of 
the "dirty hands" doctrine. Feltoe also notes that the Hoffman case did not 
involve a constitutional challenge and the dirty hands doctrine. This is so as 
the Hoffman case did not rule that a person who is arguing that a law 
requiring compulsory registration was a violation of his fundamental rights 
must first comply with that law before he is entitled to a ruling regarding the 
constitutionality of that law.96 Linington further notes that the essence of the 
Bickle case is that compliance with an impugned law is not a prerequisite to 
challenging the constitutional validity of a law concerned.97 Blom-Cooper, in 
criticising the decision of the Supreme Court, pointed out that the "dirty 
hands" doctrine was not relevant in the context of public law as it applied 
exclusively in private law.98  
Other jurisdictions around the world protect the right of a person to 
challenge the constitutional validity of legislation and that such a right is not 
affected by the "dirty hands" doctrine.99 The removal of the "dirty hands" 
                                            
only take when the contempt itself impedes the course of justice and there is no 
effective means of securing his compliance". 
92  Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe (Pvt) Ltd v Minister of State for Information and 
Publicity in the President's Office (07/03) (Pvt) 2003 ZWSC 20 (11 September 2003). 
93  Access to Information and Privacy Act [Chapter 10:27]. 
94  Feltoe date unknown http://bit.ly/1OC2vzL. 
95  F Hoffman-La Roche and Co AG v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 1975 AC 
295. 
96  Feltoe date unknown http://bit.ly/1OC2vzL. Also see Linington "Developing a New Bill 
of Rights" 55. 
97  Linington "Developing a New Bill of Rights" 56. 
98  Blom-Cooper 2003 http://bit.ly/1W4QJpn. 
99  See for example the American case of People v Hawkins 326 III 3d 992. Also see Van 
der Tang v Spain 1996 22 EHRR 363 (ECHR). 
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doctrine will result in the development of an effective culture of 
constitutionalism in Zimbabwe, and will guarantee access to the courts on 
matters relating to the Declaration of Rights.  
5.6  Direct access to the Constitutional Court 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe guarantees an individual automatic right of 
direct access to the Constitutional Court.100 Such direct access to the Court 
is allowed when it is in the interests of justice with or without leave of the 
Constitutional Court. Section 167(5) states that: 
Rules of the Constitutional Court must allow a person, when it is in the 
interests of justice and with or without leave of the Constitutional Court- (a) to 
bring a constitutional matter directly to the Constitutional Court; (b) to appeal 
directly to the Constitutional Court from any other court; (c) to appear as a 
friend of the court. 
Because of the complexity, cost and time involved in taking a case through 
the ordinary courts, this provision potentially constitutes an important 
mechanism through which indigent litigants may access the Constitutional 
Court.101 This provision in the Constitution of Zimbabwe is premised on the 
inclusive public interest ideal. However, it remains to be seen how the 
judiciary in Zimbabwe will interpret it in order to ensure the accessibility of 
the Constitutional Court. 
The above provision is similar to that found in the South African 
Constitution.102 The only difference between the two is that whilst an 
individual in Zimbabwe can directly approach the Constitutional Court with 
or without the leave of the Court, the South African provision makes it 
mandatory for an individual to obtain the leave of the South African 
Constitutional Court in order to have direct access to the Court. Section 
167(6)(a) of the South African Constitution states that the question of direct 
access to the Constitutional Court must be dealt with by national legislation 
or the rules of the Constitutional Court. Such access is possible when it is 
in the interests of justice and with leave of the Constitutional Court. It is 
important that the relevant constitutional application for direct access must 
                                            
100  Section 167(1)(a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe confirms that the Constitutional 
Court in Zimbabwe is the highest court in all constitutional matters and its decisions 
on those matters bind all other courts. 
101  See Dugard 2006 SAJHR 272. 
102  See 167(6) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe which states that "National legislation or 
the rules of the Constitutional Court must allow a person, when it is in the interests of 
justice and with leave of the Constitutional Court- (a) to bring a matter directly to the 
Constitutional Court; or (b) to appeal directly to the Constitutional Court from any other 
court..." 
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set out the grounds on which it is contended that it is in the interests of 
justice that an order for direct access be granted.103 
It is submitted that it is crucial that in addition to the constitutional guarantee 
of direct access in the Zimbabwean Constitution rules of the Constitutional 
Court must be drafted to set down criteria to assist the Court in determining 
when direct access will (and will not) be appropriate. Such criteria is 
essential in assisting a Constitutional Court to legitimately exclude cases in 
which the merits are weak, and to eliminate applicants who may attempt to 
have spurious applications heard under multiple guises.104 
Since the Constitutional Court in Zimbabwe is a newly established 
institution, rules of the Court are yet to be drafted. However, section 18(4) 
of Schedule Six of the Constitution of Zimbabwe states that the rules of the 
Supreme Court105 shall apply with necessary changes to the procedure of 
the Constitutional Court. Since the drafting of the rules of the Supreme Court 
was influenced by the Lancaster House Constitution, which provided for the 
traditional narrow rules on standing (affecting the accessibility of the 
Supreme Court), it is important that new rules of the Constitutional Court 
must be drafted to meet the demands of section 85 of the Constitution (the 
enforcement provision). This will enhance the accessibility of the 
Constitutional Court. More crucially, the judiciary should interpret such rules 
in a way that will enhance access to justice, especially for poor members of 
society. In South Africa, the Constitutional Court106 has put in place the 
criteria for an application for direct access to the Court. The criteria include 
that an application must first address the issue of the applicant's having 
exhausted all other remedies or procedures that may have been 
available.107 Second, an application has to address whether the matter is of 
sufficient urgency or public importance to warrant the applicant's being 
granted direct access.108 Third, an application has to address the prospects 
                                            
103  See Part VIII Rule 18(2)(a) of the Rules of Constitutional Court. 
104  Dugard 2006 SAJHR 273. 
105  Supreme Court Act [Chapter 7:13]. 
106  Despite the existence of this criterion, Dugard 2006 SAJHR 272 is of the opinion that 
the Constitutional Court has interpreted these rules restrictively, hence making the 
Constitutional Court a less accessible institution.  
107  See the case of Besserglik v Minister of Trade, Industry and Tourism 1996 4 SA 331 
(CC) para.6. 
108  See for example S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) paras. 4, 6; S v Dlamini 
(heard with S v Dladla; S v Joubert; S v Schietekat) 1999 4 SA 623 (CC) para. 35; 
Moseneke v The Master 2001 2 SA 18 (CC) para. 19. 
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of success based on the substantive merits of the case.109 The judiciary in 
Zimbabwe could replicate such criteria in order to determine when direct 
access will (and will not) be appropriate. 
6  Conclusion 
The discussion in this paper has highlighted the challenges relating to 
standing under the Lancaster House Constitution. It has noted that rules of 
standing are connected with and can profoundly impede or facilitate access 
to justice. The traditional rules on standing provided a barrier that prevented 
individuals from accessing courts and justice. This impacted negatively on 
the protection of human rights. However, the advent of the new Constitution 
has greatly changed the situation. Informed by the South African legal 
system, the new Constitution has broadened the right to standing. Besides 
maintaining the traditional rules of standing, the Constitution also provides 
for public interest litigation. The new rules on standing ought to facilitate an 
increase access to courts and justice for the people of Zimbabwe, and to 
ensure that their rights are protected. As a result, the issue of standing is no 
longer a barrier to human rights litigation in Zimbabwe. However, it is crucial 
that in order to enhance constitutional litigation through public interest 
standing, court rules governing public interest standing and procedures for 
the amicus curiae have to be drafted urgently. This will create certainty and 
further enhance human rights litigation in Zimbabwe. 
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